Begriffe aus der Spieltheorie: Das Feiglingsspiel (Chicken game)

Beim sogenannten Feiglingsspiel (engl. chicken game) handelt es sich um ein spezielles Problem aus dem Bereich der Spieltheorie. Bei dieser Variante eines Zweipersonenspiels verliert derjenige Spieler, der zuerst zurücksteckt (= chicken).

Im Folgenden finden Sie aus unserer Datenbank ECONIS eine Zusammenstellung ausgewählter Literatur zum Feiglingsspiel.

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Konzepte

Wesentliches Schlagwort: Feiglingsspiel

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Wesentliches Schlagwort: Spieltheorie

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Wesentliches Schlagwort: chicken game

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Literaturliste

The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken : an experimental study / Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin; Nathalie Etchart-Vincent.

  • The puzzle of cooperation in a game of chicken : an experimental study / Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin; Nathalie Etchart-Vincent.
    (2012) In: Theory and decision. – Dordrecht [u.a.]. – Bd. 72.2012, 1, (Jan.2012) S. 65-87.

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Chicken or checkin’? : rational learning in repeated chess games / Christer Gerdes; Patrik Gränsmark; Michael Rosholm.
We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster. — rational learning ; risk aversion ; beliefs

  • Chicken or checkin’? : rational learning in repeated chess games / Christer Gerdes; Patrik Gränsmark; Michael Rosholm.
    (2011) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 5862; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 27 S., 575,55 KB).

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The frames behind the games : player’s perceptions of prisoners dilemma, chicken, dictator, and ultimatum games / David J. Butler; Victoria K. Burbank; James S. Chisholm.

  • The frames behind the games : player’s perceptions of prisoners dilemma, chicken, dictator, and ultimatum games / David J. Butler; Victoria K. Burbank; James S. Chisholm.
    (2011) In: The journal of socio-economics. – Bd. 40.2011, 2, (Apr.2011) S. 103-114.

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  • The frames behind the games : player’s perceptions of prisoner’s dilemma, chicken, dictator, and ultimatum games / by David J. Butler, Victoria K. Burbank and James S. Chisholm.
    (2010) Discussion paper / University of Western Australia, Business School, Economics ; 10,03; 42 p.

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The effect of subtracting a constant from all payoffs in a hawk-dove game : experimental evidence of loss aversion in strategic Behavior / Nick Feltovich.

  • The effect of subtracting a constant from all payoffs in a hawk-dove game : experimental evidence of loss aversion in strategic Behavior / Nick Feltovich.
    (2011) In: Southern economic journal. – Chattanooga, Tenn.. – Bd. 77.2011, 4, (Apr.2011) S. 814-826.

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Monetary exit strategy and fiscal spillovers / Jan Libich; Dat Thanh Nguyen; Petr Stehlík.

  • Monetary exit strategy and fiscal spillovers / Jan Libich; Dat Thanh Nguyen; Petr Stehlík.
    (2011) CAMA working paper series ; 2011,4; Online-Ressource (16 S., 295,91 Kb).

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Conflict games with payoff uncertainty / Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjostrom.
Stag hunt and chicken games are canonical representations of two kinds of strategic interactions. In stag hunt, aggression feeds on itself, and mutual fear escalates into conflict. Chicken is a model of preemption and deterrence. With complete information, these games have multiple Nash equilbria. Using standard arguments from the Industrial Organization literature, we find sufficient conditions under which payoff uncertainty generates a unique equilibrium. These conditions encompass information structures ranging from independent types (as in our previous work) to highly correlated types (as in global games). — Conflict ; global games

  • Conflict games with payoff uncertainty / Sandeep Baliga; Tomas Sjostrom.
    (2009) Working papers / Department of Economics, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey ; 2009,05; Online-Ressource (38 S.).

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Chicken-Game : denn sie wissen nicht was sie tun / Georg Stadtmann.

A chicken game of intraindustry trade / Luca Colombo; Paola Labrecciosa; Luca Lambertini.

  • A chicken game of intraindustry trade / Luca Colombo; Paola Labrecciosa; Luca Lambertini.
    (05. Oct. 2005) [Working papers / Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche ; 548]; Online Ressource, 17 p., text.

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Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade / Giacomo Calzolari; Giovanni Immordino.

  • Hormone beef, chlorinated chicken and international trade / Giacomo Calzolari; Giovanni Immordino.
    (2005) In: European economic review. – Amsterdam. – Bd. 49.2005, 1, S. 145-172.

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Inflation, taxes, and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken / Richard C. Barnett.

  • Inflation, taxes, and the coordination of monetary and fiscal policy by use of a game of chicken / Richard C. Barnett.
    (2001) In: The Canadian journal of economics. – Boston, Mass. [u.a.]. – Bd. 34.2001, 1, S. 82-99.

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Accounting for heterogeneous choices in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and chicken games / by David Butler.

  • Accounting for heterogeneous choices in one-shot prisoner’s dilemma and chicken games / by David Butler.
    (2000) Crawley, Western Australia; 50 S.

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The evolution of conventions for chicken games of incomplete information / Mogens Jensen.

  • The evolution of conventions for chicken games of incomplete information / Mogens Jensen.
    (1999) In: Jensen, Mogens: Essays in non-cooperative game theory, evolutionary learning and signalling games. – København. – 1999, S. 1-22.

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The ecological disaster of Bitterfeld and chicken games / Jürgen Morlok and Jan Siegmund.

  • The ecological disaster of Bitterfeld and chicken games / Jürgen Morlok and Jan Siegmund.
    (1993) In: Mathematical modelling in economics. – Berlin [u.a.]. – 1993, S. 458-463.

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A theory of Brinkmanship, conflicts, and commitments / Michael Schwarz; Konstantin Sonin.

  • A theory of Brinkmanship, conflicts, and commitments / Michael Schwarz; Konstantin Sonin.
    (2008) In: The journal of law, economics, & organization. – Bd. 24.2008, 1, (Mai.2008) S. 163-183.

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  • A Theory of brinkmanship conflicts, and commitments / Michael Schwarz and Konstantin Sonin.
    (2005) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 5075 : Institutions and economic performance; 21 S.

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