Zweipersonen-Nullsummenspiele: Colonel Blotto
von Thomas Groß, 01.2011
Colonel Blotto-Spiele stellen eine klassische Variante von Zweipersonen-Nullsummenspiele dar, bei der zwei Spieler eine begrenzte Anzahl von (militärischen) Ressourcen über verschiedene (strategisch wichtige) Objekte verteilen müssen.
Web-Links:
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Colonel Blotto
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Nichtkooperatives Spiel
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Spieltheorie
Wesentliche Person: Dan Kovenock
Wesentliche Person: Brian Roberson
Literaturliste
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games / Sergiu Hart.
- Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games / Sergiu Hart.
(2008) In: International journal of game theory. – Bd. 36.2008, 3/4, S. 441-460.
- Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games / by Sergiu Hart.
(2006) Jerusalem; 27 S.
Coalitional Colonel Blotto games with application to the economics of alliances / Dan Kovenock; Brian Roberson.
- Coalitional Colonel Blotto games with application to the economics of alliances / Dan Kovenock; Brian Roberson.
(2008) Discussion papers / WZB, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Forschungsgruppe Institutionen, Staaten, Märkte ; 2008-02; IV, 25 S.
- Coalitional Colonel Blotto games with application to the economics of alliances / by Dan Kovenock; Brian Roberson.
(2007) Krannert working paper series ; 1207; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S., 995,41 KB).
Pork-barrel politics, discriminatory policies and fiscal federalism / Brian Roberson.
- Pork-barrel politics, discriminatory policies and fiscal federalism / Brian Roberson.
(2006) Discussion papers / WZB, Forschungsschwerpunkt Markt und Politische Ökonomie, Abteilung Wettbewerbsfähigkeit und industrieller Wandel ; 2006-15; III, 29 S.
The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game : [presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute 2008, Workshop on "Advances in the Theory of Contests and its Applications"] / Brian Roberson; Dmitriy Kvasov.
The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes her fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players’ resources are use it or lose itœ in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This paper examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players’ budgets is below a threshold, then the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the non-constant-sum game is equivalent up to an affine transformation to the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players’ budgets exceeds the threshold we construct a new equilibrium.
- The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game : [presented at CESifo Venice Summer Institute 2008, Workshop on "Advances in the Theory of Contests and its Applications"] / Brian Roberson; Dmitriy Kvasov.
(2008) CESifo working paper series ; 2378 : Public choice; 24 S.
- The Colonel Blotto game / Brian Roberson.
(2006) In: Economic theory. – Bd. 29.2006, 1, (Sep.2006) S. 1-24.
The Colonel Blotto game with applications to the economic, military and political sciences / by Brian A. Roberson.
- The Colonel Blotto game with applications to the economic, military and political sciences / by Brian A. Roberson.
(2005) Zugl.: West Lafayette, Ind., Purdue Univ., Diss., 2005. – ; VII, 86 S.
Strategic spending in voting competitions with social networks / Carlos Lever Guzmán.
This paper proposes a model of voting competitions (political campaigns and strategic lobbying) where voters are influenced by the opinion of their neighbors on a social network. In the unique pure strategy nash equilibrium, resources are targeted toward individuals with an influential position in the network. This finding contrasts with previous theories of strategic spending which predict that parties (or lobbies) should spend more on individuals who have a higher probability of being pivotal for the vote. The paper then tests the model using data on campaign contributions by interests groups in the US. House of Representatives. The estimations show that both network influence and pivotality are significant predictors of campaign contributions. — Network games ; strategic spending ; Colonel Blotto games ; counteractive lobbying, Bonacich centrality
- Strategic spending in voting competitions with social networks / Carlos Lever Guzmán.
(2010) Working papers / Banco de México ; 2010,16; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 47 S., 354 KB).
The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game / Brian Roberson and Dmitriy Kvasov.
The Colonel Blotto game is a two-player constant-sum game in which each player simultaneously distributes her fixed level of resources across a set of contests. In the traditional formulation of the Colonel Blotto game, the players’ resources are use it or lose itœ in the sense that any resources which are not allocated to one of the contests are forfeited. This paper examines a non-constant-sum version of the Colonel Blotto game which relaxes this use it or lose it feature. We find that if the level of asymmetry between the players’ budgets is below a threshold, then the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the non-constant-sum game is equivalent up to an affine transformation to the unique set of equilibrium univariate marginal distributions of the constant-sum game. Once the asymmetry of the players’ budgets exceeds the threshold we construct a new equilibrium. — Colonel Blotto game ; all-pay auction ; contests
- The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game / Brian Roberson and Dmitriy Kvasov.
(2010) Research paper / The University of Adelaide, School of Economics ; 2010,31; Online-Ressource (45 S., 284.40 Kb).
- The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game / Brian Roberson; Dmitriy Kvasov.
(2010) Krannert working paper series ; 1252; Online-Ressource (45 S., 616,95 KB).
- The non-constant-sum Colonel Blotto game / Brian Roberson; Dmitriy Kvasov.
(2008) CESifo working paper ; 2378 : Public choice; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 24 S., 180 KB).
The attack and defense of weakest-link networks / Dan Kovenock; Brian Roberson; Roman M. Sheremeta.
This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerilla warfare” strategy — in which a single random target is attacked — more than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets. — Colonel Blotto ; conflict resolution ; weakest-link ; best-shot ; multi-dimensional resource allocation ; experiments
- The attack and defense of weakest-link networks / Dan Kovenock; Brian Roberson; Roman M. Sheremeta.
(2010) CESifo working paper ; 3211 : Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics and Growth; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 27 S., 585 KB).
- The attack and defense of weakest-link networks / Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, and Roman M. Sheremeta.
(2010) Krannert working paper series ; 1256; Online-Ressource (26, 4 S., 987,45 KB).
Conflicts with multiple battlefields / Dan Kovenock ; Brian Roberson.
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players’ success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed “battlefields”. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each battlefield and the nature of economies or diseconomies in how battlefield out-comes and costs aggregate in determining payoffs in the overall conflict.
- Conflicts with multiple battlefields / Dan Kovenock ; Brian Roberson.
(2010) CESifo working paper series ; 3165 : Empirical and theoretical methods; 35 S.
- Conflicts with multiple battlefields / Dan Kovenock; Brian Roberson.
(2010) CESifo working paper ; 3165 : Empirical and Theoretical Methods; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 35 S., 433 KB).
- Conflicts with multiple battlefields / Dan Kovenock and Brian Roberson.
(2010) Krannert working paper series ; 1246; Online-Ressource (35 S., 638,05 KB).
Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes / Dan Kovenock ; Brian Roberson.
This paper utilizes a simple model of redistributive politics with voter abstention to analyze the impact of nonpartisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts on policy outcomes. Although such efforts are often promoted on the grounds that they provide the social benefit of increasing participation in the electoral process, we find that they have a meaningful impact on policy outcomes and are an important political influence activity for nonprofit advocacy organizations. In equilibrium, nonpartisan gotv efforts are more likely to arise in those segments of the electorate that are sufficiently small and disenfranchised (as measured by the ex ante voter abstention rate). Among those segments in which such efforts arise, the resulting gains are increasing in the level of disenfranchisement of the voters in the segment and decreasing in the segment’s size.
- Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes / Dan Kovenock ; Brian Roberson.
(2009) CESifo working paper seriess ; 2815 : Public choice; 26 S.
- Non-partisan “get-out-the-vote” efforts and policy outcomes / Dan Kovenock ; Brian Roberson.
(2009) Discussion papers / WZB, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; 2009-07; III, 26 S.
- Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes / Dan Kovenock J.; Brian Roberson.
(2009) CESifo working paper ; 2815 : Public Choice; Online-Ressource ( 26 S.).
Suicide terrorism and the weakest link / Daniel G. Arce ; Dan Kovenock J. ; Brian Roberson.
In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures.
- Suicide terrorism and the weakest link / Daniel G. Arce ; Dan Kovenock J. ; Brian Roberson.
(2009) CESifo working paper series ; 2753 : Public choice; 26 S.
- Suicide terrorism and the weakest link / Daniel G. Arce; Dan Kovenock J.; Brian Roberson.
(2009) CESifo working paper ; 2753 : Public Choice; Online-Ressource ( 26 S.).
An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games / Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta.
This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a guerilla warfareœ strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a stochastic complete coverageœ strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields.
- An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games / Subhasish M. Chowdhury, Dan Kovenock, Roman M. Sheremeta.
(2009) Discussion papers / WZB, Schwerpunkt Märkte und Politik, Abteilung Marktprozesse und Steuerung ; 2009-08; III, 31 S.
- An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games / Subhasish M. Chowdhury ; Dan Kovenock ; Roman M. Sheremeta.
(2009) CESifo working paper series ; 2688 : Empirical and theoretical methods; 31 S.
- An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games / Subhasish M. Chowdhury; Dan Kovenock; Roman M. Sheremeta.
(2009) CESifo working paper ; 2688 : Empirical and theoretical methods; Online-Ressource (31 S.).
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