Zur Ökonomie von Ehe und Familie
von Elisabeth Flieger, 08.2010
Anlässlich der Jahrestagung des Vereins für Socialpolitik mit dem Thema “Ökonomie der Familie”, die in diesem Jahr in Kiel stattfindet, haben wir eine Literaturliste mit dem Schwerpunkt Ökonomie der Ehe zusammengestellt. Das Plenum, das sich am letzten Konferenztag dem Thema “Economics of Marriage” widmet, wird der renommierte Familienökonom Alessandro Cigno (Universität Florenz) leiten.
Literaturliste
What’s the use of marriage? / Alessandro Cigno.
We use elementary game-theoretical concepts to compare domestic equilibria with and without marriage. In particular, we examine the effects of marriage legislation, matrimonial property regime, and divorce court sentencing practice, on the decision to marry, and on the choice of game conditional on marriage. We find that, in the absence of social stigma or legal discrimination against unmarried couples, a couple will marry only if marriage serves as a commitment device which facilitates cooperation. — Gender ; cohabitation ; marriage ; divorce ; alimony ; matrimonial property ; fertility ; division of labour
- What’s the use of marriage? / Alessandro Cigno.
(2009) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 4635; Online-Ressource (25 S.).
The political economy of intergenerational cooperation / Alessandro Cigno.
The paper examines the scope for mutually beneficial intergenerational cooperation, and looks at various attempts to theoretically explain the emergence of norms and institutions that facilitate this cooperation. After establishing a normative framework, we examine the properties of the laissez-faire solution in a pure market economy, and in one where reproductive decisions and intergenerational transfers are governed by self-enforcing family constitutions. We then show that first and second-best policies include a pension and a child benefit scheme. Finally, we look at the possibility that intergenerational redistribution might be supported by either a constitution, or some kind of voting equilibrium.
- The political economy of intergenerational cooperation / Alessandro Cigno.
(2006) In: Applications. – 2006, S. 1505-1558.
- The political economy of intergenerational cooperation / Alessandro Cigno.
(Dec. 2005) CESifo working paper ; 1632 : Public choice; Online-Ressource, 34 S. = 289 KB, Text.
- The political economy of intergenerational cooperation / Alessandro Cigno.
(2005) CESifo working paper series ; 1632 : Public choice; 34 S.
Intergenerational transfers without altruism : family, market and state / Alessandro Cigno.
- Intergenerational transfers without altruism : family, market and state / Alessandro Cigno.
(1993) In: European journal of political economy. – Amsterdam [u.a.]. – Bd. 9.1993, 4, S. 505-518.
The economics of child labour / Alessandro Cigno and Furio C. Rosati.
- The economics of child labour / Alessandro Cigno and Furio C. Rosati.
(2005) Oxford [u.a.]; XII, 249 S.
- Sharing the wealth : demographic change and economic transfers between generations / ed. by Andrew Mason ….
(2000) 1. publ. – Oxford [u.a.]; XVI, 408 S.
- Cost of children, parental decisions, and family policy / Alessandro Cigno.
(1996) In: Labour. – Bd. 10.1996, 3, S. 461-474.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1994) Oxford; VII, 212 S.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1994) 1. paperback ed. – Oxford [u.a.]; VII, 212 S.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1994) Paperback ed., 1. publ. – Oxford; VII, 212 S.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1993) Rezension zu: Cigno, Alessandro :: The economics of the family : Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991 / [rezensiert von:] Barbara Krugann In: Kyklos. – Bd. 46.1993, 1, S. 129-130.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1992) Rezension zu: Cigno, Alessandro :: Economics of the family : Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991 / rezensiert von: John Treble In: The economic journal. – Bd. 102.1992, 412, (mai.1992) S. 658-659.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1991) Oxford; VII, 212 S. : graph. Darst.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1991) Oxford; VII, 212 S.
- The economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1991) Oxford; VII, 212 S.
- Economics of the family / Alessandro Cigno.
(1991) Oxford u.a.; 212 S.
The economies of scale of living together and how they are shared : estimates based on a collective household model / Aline Bütikofer; Michael Gerfin.
How large are the economies of scale of living together? And how do partners share their resources? The first question is usually answered by equivalence scales. Traditional estimation and application of equivalence scales assumes equal sharing of income within the household. This paper uses data on financial satisfaction to simultaneously estimate the sharing rule and the economy of scale parameter in a collective household model. The estimates indicate substantial scale economies of living together, especially for couples who have lived together for some time. On average, wives receive almost 50% of household resources, but there is heterogeneity with respect to the wives’ contribution to household income and the duration of the relationship. — Collective Household Models ; Sharing Rule ; Equivalence Scale ; Subjective data
- The economies of scale of living together and how they are shared : estimates based on a collective household model / Aline Bütikofer; Michael Gerfin.
(2009) Discussion papers / Universität Bern, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Department of Economics ; 09,03; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S.).
- The economies of scale of living together and how they are shared : estimates based on a collective household model / Aline Bütikofer; Michael Gerfin.
(2009) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 4327; Online-Ressource (25 S.).
Does marriage pay more than cohabitation? / Katherin Barg; Miriam Beblo.
- Does marriage pay more than cohabitation? / Katherin Barg; Miriam Beblo.
(2009) In: Journal of economic studies. – Bradford. – Bd. 36.2009, 5/6, S. 552-570.
Effect of labor division between wife and husband on the risk of divorce : evidence from German data / Kornelius Kraft; Stefanie Neimann.
Using German panel data from 1984 to 2007, we analyze the impact of labor division between husband and wife on the risk of divorce. Gary Becker’s theory of marriage predicts that specialization in domestic and market work, respectively, reduces the risk of separation. Traditionally, the breadwinner role is assigned to the husband, however, female labor force participation and their wages have risen substantially. Our results suggest that there are gender-specific differences, e.g. female breadwinner-couples have a substantially higher risk of divorce than male breadwinner-couples. In contrast, the equal division does not significantly alter the probability of separation. — Divorce ; labor division ; Germany
- Effect of labor division between wife and husband on the risk of divorce : evidence from German data / Kornelius Kraft; Stefanie Neimann.
(2009) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 4515; Online-Ressource (16 S.).
Marriage, cohabitation and commitment / Murat Iyigun.
This paper combines partner matching with an intra-household allocation model where couples decide if they want to marry or cohabitate. Marriage encourages but does not ensure a higher level of spousal commitment, which in turn can generate a larger marital surplus. Individuals’ marital preferences and commitment costs vary, and sorting equilibria are based on individuals’ marital preferences and propensity to commit. In all equilibria, some married couples are able to cooperate and operate efficiently, but some married and all cohabiting couples act with limited commitment and non-cooperatively. When spousal marital commitment costs are gender symmetric, there is a pure-sorting equilibrium in which all partners who prefer to act with commitment in marriage are matched with someone who has the same preference. In such an equilibrium, the benefits of marital commitment accrue to both partners. When commitment costs are not gender neutral, there can also be mixed-matching equilibria in which a partner who is willing to act with commitment in marriage is matched with someone who is not. In all such equilibria, the benefits of marital commitment accrue only to those men or women who are in short supply. Consequently, a shortage of men (women) who can maritally commit makes all women (men) worse off and materially indifferent between marriage or cohabitation. An excess supply of men who prefer marriage not only reduces the marriage incentives of men and raises those of women, but also the marital commitment incentives of men. As a corollary, if the gains from marriage fall, not only will more individuals choose to cohabitate but more married couples will act non-cooperatively. — Collective model ; intra-household bargaining ; modes of partnership choice
- Marriage, cohabitation and commitment / Murat Iyigun.
(2009) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 4341; Online-Ressource (45 S.).
- Bargaining and specialization in marriage / Murat Iyigun.
(Sept. 2005) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 1744; Online-Ressource, 30 S., Text.
How “Chicagoan” are Gary Becker’s economic models of marriage? / Shoshana Grossbard.
This paper describes Gary Becker’s theoretical models of marriage. At the micro-level, these are all rational choice models. At the market level, Becker offers two major types of models: partial equilibrium models based on Price Theory as taught by Marshall and Friedman and optimal sorting models based on optimal assignment models. The paper examines some of the possible intellectual influences on Becker’s theory of marriage, compares Becker’s research on marriage with that of some scholars interested in intra-marriage distribution, and documents that Becker’s students at Chicago were more interested in Becker’s Friedmanian models of marriage than in his optimal assignment models.
- How “Chicagoan” are Gary Becker’s economic models of marriage? / Shoshana Grossbard.
(2009) CESifo working paper series; 2637 : Empirical and theoretical methods; 18 S.
- How “Chicagoan” are Gary Becker’s economic models of marriage? / Shoshana Grossbard.
(2009) CESifo working paper ; 2637 : Empirical and theoretical methods; Online-Ressource (18 S.).
Marriage matching and gender satisfaction / Vicki Knoblauch.
- Marriage matching and gender satisfaction / Vicki Knoblauch.
(2009) In: Social choice and welfare. – Berlin. – Bd. 32.2009, 1, (Jan.2009) S. 15-27.
A theory of rational marriage and divorce / Vicky Barham; Rose Anne Devlin.
- A theory of rational marriage and divorce / Vicky Barham; Rose Anne Devlin.
(2009) In: European economic review. – Amsterdam. – Bd. 53.2009, 1, (Jan.2009) S. 93-106.
On Gale and Shapley “college admissions and stability of marriage” / J. J. Gabszewicz, F. Garcia, J. Pais and J. Resende.
- On Gale and Shapley “college admissions and stability of marriage” / J. J. Gabszewicz, F. Garcia, J. Pais and J. Resende.
(2008) Discussion paper / UCL, Département des Sciences Economiques ; 2008,46; Online-Ressource (7 S.).
- On Gale and Shapley “college admissions and stability of marriage” / Jean J. Gabszewicz, Filomena Garcia, Joana Pais and Joana Resende.
(2008) CORE discussion paper ; 2008,67; Online-Ressource (7 S.).
- On Gale and Shapley “college admissions and stability of marriage” / Jean J. Gabszewicz, Filomena Garcia, Joana Pais and Joana Resende.
(2008) CORE discussion paper ; 2008,67; 7 S.
On the origin of the family / by Marco Francesconi, Christian Ghiglino and Motty Perry.
This paper presents an overlapping generations model to explain why humans live in families rather than in other pair groupings. Since most non-human species are not familial, something special must be behind the family. It is shown that the two necessary features that explain the origin of the family are given by uncertain paternity and overlapping cohorts of dependent children. With such two features built into our model, and under the assumption that individuals care only for the propagation of their own genes, our analysis indicates that fidelity families dominate promiscuous pair bonding, in the sense that they can achieve greater survivorship and enhanced genetic fitness. The explanation lies in the free riding behavior that characterizes the interactions between competing fathers in the same promiscuous pair grouping. Kin ties could also be related to the emergence of the family. When we consider a kinship system in which an adult male transfers resources not just to his offspring but also to his younger siblings, we find that kin ties never emerge as an equilibrium outcome in a promiscuous environment. In a fidelity family environment, instead, kinship can occur in equilibrium and, when it does, it is efficiency enhancing in terms of greater survivorship and fitness. The model can also be used to shed light on the issue as to why virtually all major world religions are centered around the importance of the family. — Fatherhood uncertainty ; Free riding ; Kinship systems ; Religion ; Overlapping generations ; Divorce and blended families
- On the origin of the family / by Marco Francesconi, Christian Ghiglino and Motty Perry.
(2010) Jerusalem; 36 S.
- On the origin of the family / Marco Francesconi, Christian Ghiglino and Motty Perry.
(2010) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 7629 : Labour economics; 36 S.
- On the origin of the family / Marco Francesconi; Christian Ghiglino; Motty Perry.
(2010) Discussion paper series / University of Essex, Department of Economics ; 682; Online-Ressource (39 S.).
- On the origin of the family / Marco Francesconi; Christian Ghiglino; Motty Perry.
(2009) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 4637; Online-Ressource (36 S.).
Marriage and consumption / Laura Blow, Martin Browning and Mette Ejrnaes.
- Marriage and consumption / Laura Blow, Martin Browning and Mette Ejrnaes.
(2009) Department of Economics discussion paper series / University of Oxford ; 427; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 25 S.).
Le couple, l’amour et l’argent : la construction conjugale des dimensions économiques de la relation amoureuse / Caroline Henchoz.
- Le couple, l’amour et l’argent : la construction conjugale des dimensions économiques de la relation amoureuse / Caroline Henchoz.
(2008) Questions sociologiques; 261 S.
Frauen und Geld : wider die ökonomische Unsichtbarkeit von Frauen / hrsg. von R. Johanna Regnath ….
- (2008) Königstein / Taunus; 320 S.
- Geld und Liebe : Geldarrangements in Partnerschaften / Tatjana Rosendorfer.
(2008) In: Frauen und Geld. – 2008, S. 87-111.
Geldverwaltung und -verteilung in Paarbeziehungen / Wolfgang Ludwig-Mayerhofer.
- Geldverwaltung und -verteilung in Paarbeziehungen / Wolfgang Ludwig-Mayerhofer.
(2006) In: Zeitschrift für Sozialreform. – Stuttgart. – Bd. 52.2006, 4, S. 467-491.
Material vs. spiritual : a novel economics perspective on marriage and divorce / Xuemei Liu.
- Material vs. spiritual : a novel economics perspective on marriage and divorce / Xuemei Liu.
(2008) In: The journal of socio-economics. – Amsterdam [u.a.]. – Bd. 37.2008, 6, (Dez.2008) S. 2330-2339.
Marriage, commitment and divorce in a matching model with differential aging / Adrian Masters.
- Marriage, commitment and divorce in a matching model with differential aging / Adrian Masters.
(2008) In: Review of economic dynamics. – Amsterdam. – Bd. 11.2008, 3, (Jul.2008) S. 614-628.
Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage : the bargaining family under scrutiny / Helmut Rainer.
- Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage : the bargaining family under scrutiny / Helmut Rainer.
(2008) In: Journal of population economics. – Bd. 21.2008, 2, (Apr.2008) S. 305-329.
- Gender discrimination and efficiency in marriage : the bargaining family under scrutiny / Helmut Rainer.
(Nov. 2004) Discussion papers / University of Essex, Department of Economics ; 586; Online-Ressource, 37 p. text.
Harmonizing conflict in husband-wife purchase decision making : perceived fairness and spousal influence dynamics / Chenting Su; Kevin Zheng Zhou; Nan Zhou; Julie Juan Li.
- Harmonizing conflict in husband-wife purchase decision making : perceived fairness and spousal influence dynamics / Chenting Su; Kevin Zheng Zhou; Nan Zhou; Julie Juan Li.
(2008) In: Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science. – New York, NY. – Bd. 36.2008, 3, S. 378-394.
An assignment model with divorce and remarriage / Pierre-Andre Chiappori; Murat Iyigun; Yoram Weiss.
We develop a two-sided matching model with positive sorting, divorce and remarriage. Match quality for each couple is revealed ex post and those with poor draws divorce. Competition determines lifetime expected utilities but per-period utilities depend on the laws that govern the distribution of assets upon divorce. We discuss separately cases in which remarriage is or is not feasible and cases in which commitments are or are not made. In all cases, lifetime utilities are exactly pinned down by equilibrium (stability) requirements. Moreover, ex-post Nash bargaining and ex-ante commitment yield the same non-contingent intertemporal allocations. We then analyze the impact of changes in the property division upon divorce, considering for instance a reform that favors women. The short-term impact of the reform on the allocations of already married wives is positive. However, its long-term impact on yet unmarried women is not because such a reform generates lower utility for women within marriage which exactly offsets their higher prospective divorce settlement. When remarriage is possible, more complex effects could occur: the reform typically alters divorce probabilities and it may affect the total surplus generated by marriage, thus either increasing both spouses’ welfare or decreasing both. — Matching ; intra-household allocations ; Becker-Coase theorem
- An assignment model with divorce and remarriage / Pierre-Andre Chiappori; Murat Iyigun; Yoram Weiss.
(2008) IZA discussion papers ; 3892; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 45 S.).
Allocation within the household : direct survey evidence / Martin Browning and Jens Bonke.
- Allocation within the household : direct survey evidence / Martin Browning and Jens Bonke.
(2009) Department of Economics discussion paper series / University of Oxford ; 429; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 53 S.).
- Allocation within the household : direct survey evidence / Martin Browning and Jens Bonke.
(Oct. 2006) Department of Economics discussion paper series / University of Oxford ; 286; Online-Ressource, 31 S., Text.
Does income taxation affect partners’ household chores? / Arthur Van Soest; Elena Stancanelli.
We study the impact of income taxation on both partners’ allocation of time to market work and unpaid house work in households with two adults. We estimate a structural household utility model in which the marginal utilities of leisure and house work of both partners are modelled as random coefficients, depending on observed and unobserved characteristics of the household and the two partners. We use a discrete choice model with choice sets of 2,401 points for each couple, distinguishing seven market work intervals and seven house work intervals for each partner. The model is estimated using data for France, which taxes incomes of married couples jointly, like, for instance, Germany and the US. We find that both partners’ market and non-market time allocation decisions are responsive to changes in the tax system or other policy changes that change the financial incentives. Women’s time allocation is more responsive to the own and the partner’s wage rate than men’s. Tax policy simulations suggest that moving from joint taxation for married couples to separate taxation of each spouse would go a small step in the direction of equalizing market and non-market work of spouses. Selective taxation with smaller tax rates for women than for men would magnify these effects. — Time use ; taxation ; labour supply ; discrete choice models
- Does income taxation affect partners’ household chores? / Arthur Van Soest; Elena Stancanelli.
(2010) Document de travail OFCE ; 2010,12; Online-Ressource (40 S.).
- Does income taxation affect partners’ household chores? / Arthur Van Soest* and Elena Stancanelli.
(2010) Discussion Paper / CentER for Economic Research ; 2010,76; Online-Ressource (40 S.).
- Does income taxation affect partners’ household chores? / Arthur Van Soest; Elena Stancanelli.
(2010) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 5038; Online-Ressource (40 S.).
Families, time and money in Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States / Peter Burton and Shelley Phipps.
Using microdata from the Luxembourg Income Study, we assess ‘time crunch’ for families with children in Canada, Germany, Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S. Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that both time and money are important inputs to the well-being of parents and children. We present cross-country comparisons of ‘total available adult hours’ under different assumptions about the varying time needs of families of different size. We also present estimates of ‘time shortages.’ In all cases, we provide separate estimates for families located at different points in the country income distributions, since being short of both time and money is likely to be particularly problematic. Although paid work hours are highest for high-income families, we nonetheless find significant numbers of lower-income families in which parents work very long hours in the paid labour market; this is particularly the case in the U.S.
- Families, time and money in Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States / Peter Burton and Shelley Phipps.
(Nov. 2009) Working paper / Luxembourg Income Study ; 523; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 52 S.).
- Families time and money in Canada, Germany, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States / by Peter Burton and Shelley Phipps.
(2007) In: The review of income and wealth. – Bd. 53.2007, 3, (Sep.2007) S. 460-483.
Family investments in children : what drives the social gap in parenting? / Jens Bonke; Gösta Esping-Andersen.
- Family investments in children : what drives the social gap in parenting? / Jens Bonke; Gösta Esping-Andersen.
(2009) Study paper / Rockwool Foundation Research Unit ; 26; 33 S.
Family-size effects on earnings : definitions matter / Elina Lampi; Katarina Nordblom.
- Family-size effects on earnings : definitions matter / Elina Lampi; Katarina Nordblom.
(2009) Working papers in economics / Department of Economics, Göteborg University ; 364; Online-Ressource (8 S., 144 KB).
Valuing children : rethinking the economics of the family / Nancy Folbre.
- Valuing children : rethinking the economics of the family / Nancy Folbre.
(2008) The family and public policy; VIII, 235 S.
Specialization in the bargaining family / Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo.
- Specialization in the bargaining family / Raphaela Hyee & Julio R. Robledo.
(2010) Discussion papers in economics / School of Economics ; 10,06; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 33 S.).
- Specialization in the bargaining family / Raphaela Hyee and Julio R. Robledo.
(2009) Working paper series / Department of Economics, Queen Mary, University of London ; 640; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 31 S.).
Specialization in the bargaining family / Raphaela Hyee and Julio R. Robledo./ ed. by Peter Rupert. (Frontiers of family economics / ser. ed. Peter Rupert ; Vol. 1)
- Specialization in the bargaining family / Raphaela Hyee and Julio R. Robledo./ ed. by Peter Rupert. (Frontiers of family economics / ser. ed. Peter Rupert ; Vol. 1)
(2008) 1. ed. – Bingley, UK; XII, 270 S.
- Frontiers of family economics / ser. ed. Peter Rupert.
(2008-) Bingley [u.a.]
Essays on household time allocation decisions in a collective household model / Heidi Silvennoinen.
- Essays on household time allocation decisions in a collective household model / Heidi Silvennoinen.
(2008) Zugl.: Helsinki, School of Economics, Diss., 2008. – ; getr. Zählung.
Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining / Joaquín Andaluz; Miriam Marcén; José Alberto Molina.
This paper studies the dynamics of bargaining in an intrahousehold context. To explore long-term partner relationships, we analyse bilateral bargaining by considering that spouses take decisions sequentially. We conclude that a greater valuation of the present, rather than the future, for the spouse who takes the second decision, increases the set of possible sustainable agreements, as well as the proportion of time that this agent devotes to a family good. — Family bargaining ; Stackelberg game ; family good
- Dynamics of intrahousehold bargaining / Joaquín Andaluz; Miriam Marcén; José Alberto Molina.
(2008) IZA discussion papers ; 3757; Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: 13 S.).
Japanese law in context : readings in society, the economy, and politics / publ. by the Harvard University Asia Center. Ed. by Curtis J. Milhaupt ; J. Mark Ramseyer ; Michael K. Young.
- Japanese law in context : readings in society, the economy, and politics / publ. by the Harvard University Asia Center. Ed. by Curtis J. Milhaupt ; J. Mark Ramseyer ; Michael K. Young.
(2001) Harvard East Asian monographs ; 198; XV, 644 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1998) Enl. ed., 1. paperback ed., 4. print. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1994) Enlarged ed., 3. print. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S. : graph. Darst.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1994) Enl. ed., 1. paperback ed., 3. print. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1993) Enl. ed., 1. paperback ed. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1991) Enl. ed. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1991) Enl. ed. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1991) Enl. ed. – Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 424 S.
- [Besprechung von:] Becker, Gary S.: A treatise on the family. Cambridge/Mass. 1981
(1982) In: Population and development review. – Bd. 8.1982, 2, S. 393-397.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S(tanley) Becker.
(1981) Cambridge, Mass u.a.; XII, 288 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1981) Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.]; XII, 288 S.
- A treatise on the family / Gary S. Becker.
(1981) Cambridge, Mass.; 288 S.
On the economics of the family : reply to a skeptic / by Gary S. Becker.
- On the economics of the family : reply to a skeptic / by Gary S. Becker.
(1989) In: The American economic review. – Nashville, Tenn.. – Bd. 79.1989, 3, S. 514-518.
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Ehe
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Familienökonomik
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Theorie
Wesentliche Person: Gary Stanley Becker
Wesentliche Person: Alessandro Cigno
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