“Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral” – oder doch umgekehrt?
In einem Wissenschaftsgespräch mit der Wochenzeitung DIE ZEIT spricht der Ökonom Ernst Fehr, Leiter des Instituts für Empirische Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität Zürich, über seine Forschungsinteressen in der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung und Neuroökonomie. Auch Gerechtigkeitssinn, Altruismus und Vertrauen bestimmen unser soziales und wirtschaftliches Verhalten; die Vorstellung vom homo oeconomicus als rein rational und nutzenmaximierend handelndem Menschen wird so in Frage gestellt, beziehungsweise um entscheidende Aspekte erweitert.
Eine Auswahlbibliografie seiner Publikationen aus unserer Datenbank ECONIS verschafft Einblicke in das Werk Fehrs; berücksichtigt werden daneben einige Veröffentlichungen anderer Wissenschaftler zu diesem Thema.
On inequity aversion : a reply to Binmore and Shaked / Ernst Fehr; Klaus M. Schmidt.
We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.
- (2009) Discussion paper / Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems ; 256
prüfen & bestellen Online-Ressource (18 S.).
- (May 2005) CESifo working paper ; 1467 : Industrial organisation
- (2005) CESifo working paper series ; 1467 : Industrial organisation prüfen & bestellen
28 S.
Contracts, reference points, and competition : behavioral effects of the fundamental transformation / Ernst Fehr; Christian Zehnder; Oliver Hart.
In a recent paper, Hart and Moore (2008) introduce new behavioral assumptions that can explain long term contracts and important aspects of the employment relation. However, so far there exists no direct evidence that supports these assumptions and, in particular, Hart and Moore’s notion that contracts provide reference points. In this paper, we examine experimentally the behavioral forces stipulated in their theory. The evidence confirms the model’s prediction that there is a tradeoff between rigidity and flexibility in a trading environment with incomplete contracts and ex ante uncertainty about the state of nature. Flexible contracts – which would dominate rigid contracts under standard assumptions -cause a significant amount of shading on ex post performance while under rigid contracts much less shading occurs. Thus, although rigid contracts rule out trading in some states of the world, parties frequently implement them. While our results are broadly consistent with established behavioral concepts, they cannot easily be explained by existing theories. The experiment appears to reveal a new behavioral force: ex ante competition legitimizes the terms of a contract, and aggrievement and shading occur mainly about outcomes within the contract. — Contracts ; reference points ; experiment
- (2009) In: Journal of the European Economic Association. – Bd. 7.2009, 2/3, (4/5.2009) S. 561-572. prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) IZA discussion papers ; 3889
Egalitarianism and competitiveness / by Björn Bartling; Ernst Fehr; Michel André Maréchal, and Daniel Schunk.
- (2009) In: The American economic review. – Nashville, Tenn.. – Bd. 99.2009, 2, (Mai.2009) S. 93-98. prüfen & bestellen
Modeling individual choices in experiments : reply to Conte and Moffatt / Alexander W. Cappelen ….
- (2009) Discussion paper / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Department of Economics ; 2009,07
A behavioral account of the labor market : the role of fairness concerns / Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette and Christian Zehnder.
In this paper, we argue that important labor market phenomena can be better understood if one takes (i) the inherent incompleteness and relational nature of most employment contracts and (ii) the existence of reference-dependent fairness concerns among a substantial share of the population into account. Theory shows and experiments confirm, that even if fairness concerns were only to exert weak effects in one-shot interactions, repeated interactions greatly magnify the relevance of such concerns on economic outcomes. We also review evidence from laboratory and field experiments examining the role of wages and fairness on effort, derive predictions from our approach for entry-level wages and incumbent workers’ wages, confront these predictions with the evidence, and show that reference-dependent fairness concerns may have important consequences for the effects of economic policies such as minimum wage laws. — Fairness ; contracts ; wages ; effort ; experiments
- (2008) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 394 prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) IZA discussion papers ; 3901
On the economics and biology of trust / Ernst Fehr.
In recent years, many social scientists have claimed that trust plays an important role in economic and social transactions. Despite its proposed importance, the measurement and the definition of trust seem to be not fully settled, and the identification of the exact role of trust in economic interactions has proven to be elusive. It is still not clear whether trust is just an epiphenomenon of good institutions or whether it plays an independent causal role capable of shaping important aggregate economic outcomes. In this paper, I rely on a behavioral definition of trust that enables us to relate it to economic primitives such as preferences and beliefs. I review strong biological and behavioral evidence indicating that trusting is not just a special case of risk-taking, but based on important forms of social preferences such as betrayal aversion. Behaviorally defined trust also opens the door for understanding national and ethnic trust differences in terms of differences in preferences and beliefs, and it suggests ways to examine and interpret a causal role of trust. — Trust ; preferences ; beliefs ; biological basis
- (2009) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 399 prüfen & bestellen
- (2009) In: Journal of the European Economic Association. – Bd. 7.2009, 2/3, (4/5.2009) S. 235-266. prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) IZA discussion papers ; 3895
On reputation: a microfoundation of contract enforcement and price rigidity / Ernst Fehr, Martin Brown and Christian Zehnder.
We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substantially. This effect is, however, associated with a considerable bilateralisation of market interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price rigidities arising from social preferences. Thus, in markets characterized by moral hazard, reputational incentives unambiguously increase mutually beneficial exchanges, reduce rents, and render markets more responsive to supply and demand shocks. — Reputation ; reciprocity ; relational contracts ; price rigidity ; wage rigidity
- (2009) In: The economic journal. – Bd. 119.2009, (Mar.2009) S. 333-353. prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 384 prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) Swiss National Bank Working papers ; 2008,17 prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 3655
Cooperativeness and impatience in the tragedy of the commons / Ernst Fehr and Andreas Leibbrandt.
This paper examines the role of other-regarding and time preferences for cooperation in the field. We study the preferences of fishermen whose main, and often only, source of income stems from using a common pool resource (CPR). The exploitation of a CPR involves a negative interpersonal and inter-temporal externality because individuals who exploit the CPR reduce the current and the future yield for both others and themselves. Accordingly, economic theory predicts that more cooperative and more patient individuals should be less likely to exploit the CPR. Our data supports this prediction because fishermen who exhibit a higher propensity for cooperation in a laboratory public goods experiment, and those who show more patience in a laboratory time preference experiment, exploit the fishing grounds less in their daily lives. Moreover, because the laboratory public goods game exhibits no inter-temporal spillovers, measured time preferences should not predict cooperative behavior in the laboratory. This prediction is also borne out by our data. Thus, laboratory preference measures are useful to capture important dimensions of field behavior. — Cooperation ; common pool resource ; experiments ; generalizability ; methodology
- (2008) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 378 prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 3625
Contracts as reference points : experimental evidence / Ernst Fehr, Oliver Hart and Christian Zehnder.
- (2008) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 393 prüfen & bestellen
- (2008) Cambridge, Mass. prüfen & bestellen
Introduction: a brief history of neuroeconomics / Paul W. Glimcher; Colin F. Camerer; Ernst Fehr and Russell A. Poldrack.
- (2008) In: Neuroeconomics. – Amsterdam [u.a.]. – 2008, S. 1-12. prüfen & bestellen
Wage differentials in experimental efficiency wage markets / Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter.
- (2008) In: Handbook of experimental economics results. – Amsterdam [u.a.]. – 2008, S. 120-126. prüfen & bestellen
Testing theories of fairness – intentions matter / Armin Falk; Ernst Fehr; Urs Fischbacher.
- (2008) In: Games and economic behavior. – Amsterdam. – Bd. 62.2008, 1, (Jan.2008) S. 287-303. prüfen & bestellen
(Over)-stylizing experimental findings and theorizing with sweeping generality / Werner Güth; Hartmut Kliemt; M. Vittoria Levati.
Human decision making is a process guided by different and partly competing mo-tivations that can each dominate behavior and lead to different effects depending on strength and circumstances. “Over-stylizingœ neglects such competing concerns and context-dependence, although it facilitates the emergence of elaborate general theories. We illustrate by examples from social dilemma experiments and inequality aversion theories that sweeping empirical claims should be avoided. — Context-dependent preferences ; experimental economics ; equity theo-ries
- (2008) Jena economic research papers ; 2008,092
Essays in behavioral economics / vorgelegt von Johannes Abeler.
- (2008) Bonn, Univ., Diss, 2008. –
- (2008) Bonn Volltext prüfen & bestellen Online-Ressource (PDF-Datei: VI, 126 S., 1,7 MB).
- (2008) Bonn, Univ., Diss., 2008. – Nicht für den Austausch. – prüfen & bestellen
Does laboratory trading mirror behavior in real world markets? : fair bargaining and competitive bidding on EBay / Gary E. Bolton; Axel Ockenfels.
We conducted a controlled field experiment on eBay and examined to what extent both social and competitive laboratory behavior is robust to institutionally complex real world markets with experienced traders, who selected themselves into these markets. EBay’s natural trading system provides bridges between lab and field environment that can be exploited to explore differences in behavior in the two environments. We find that many sellers do not make use of their commitment power as predicted by standard theories of both selfish and social behavior. However, a concern for equity strongly affects outcomes and reputation building in bilateral bargaining, while buyer competition effectively masks this concern and robustly yields equilibrium outcomes. The dichotomy of behaviors mirrors observations in laboratory research. Furthermore, we find that behavioral patterns in the field experiment mirror fully naturally occurring trading patterns in the market.
- (2008) CESifo working paper series ; 2241 : Empirical and theoretical methods Volltext prüfen & bestellen
- (Mar. 2008) CESifo working paper ; 2241 : Empirical and theoretical methods
Fairness and contract design / by Ernst Fehr; Alexander Klein and Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2007) In: Econometrica. – [Wechselnde Verlagsorte]. – Bd. 75.2007, 1, (Jan.2007) S. 121-154. prüfen & bestellen
Adding a stick to the carrot? : the interaction of bonuses and fines / by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2007) In: The American economic review. – Nashville, Tenn.. – Bd. 97.2007, 2, (Mai.2007) S. 177-181. prüfen & bestellen
The role of equality and efficiency in social preferences / Ernst Fehr, Michael Naef and Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2006) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 300
- (2005) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 5368 : Industrial organization prüfen & bestellen
The economics of fairness, reciprocity and altruism : experimental evidence and new theories / Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2006) In: Handbook of the economics of giving, altruism and reciprocity. – Amsterdam [u.a.]. – 2006, S. 615-691. prüfen & bestellen
Fairness perceptions and reservation wages : the behavioral effects of minimum wage laws / Armin Falk; Ernst Fehr; Christian Zehnder.
- (2006) In: The quarterly journal of economics. – Cambridge, Mass.. – Bd. 121.2006, 4, (Nov.2006) S. 1347-1381. prüfen & bestellen
Neuroökonomik : die Erforschung der biologischen Grundlagen des menschlichen Sozialverhaltens / Ernst Fehr.
- (2006) Volkswirtschaftliche Beiträge ; 3
Special issue: Behavioral economics / guest ed.: Roberto A. Weber and Colin F. Camerer.
- (2006) Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association ; 9.2006,3 prüfen & bestellen
- (2006) In: Experimental economics. – Bd. 9.2006, 3, (Sep.2006) S. 187-192. prüfen & bestellen
- (1999) In: Journal of economic behavior & organization. – Bd. 39.1999, 1, S. 59-82. prüfen & bestellen
Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights / Ernst Fehr, Susanne Kremhelmer and Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2008) In: The economic journal. – Bd. 118.2008, (Aug.2008) S. 1262-1284. prüfen & bestellen
- (2005) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 5369 : Industrial organization prüfen & bestellen
- (2005) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 224
Driving forces behind informal sanctions / Armin Falk; Ernst Fehr; Urs Fischbacher.
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators’ punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group’s average or the group’s total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories assuming that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness-driven informal sanctions. — sanctioning ; cooperation ; social norm ; reciprocity ; fairness ; spitefulness
- (June 2005) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 1635
Neuroeconomic foundations of trust and social preferences : initial evidence / by Ernst Fehr, Urs Fischbacher, and Michael Kosfeld.
This paper discusses recent neuroeconomic evidence related to other-regarding behaviors and the decision to trust in other people’s other-regarding behavior. This evidence supports the view that people derive nonpecuniary utility (i) from mutual cooperation in social dilemma (SD) games and (ii) from punishing unfair behavior. Thus, mutual cooperation and the punishment of free riders in SD games is not irrational, but better understood as rational behavior of people with corresponding social preferences. We also report the results of a recent study that examines the impact of the neuropeptide Oxytocin (OT) on trusting and trustworthy behavior in a sequential SD. Animal studies have identified Oxytocin as a hormone that induces prosocial approach behavior, suggesting that it may also affect prosocial behavior in humans. Indeed, the study shows that subjects given Oxytocin exhibit much more trusting behavior, suggesting that OT has a direct impact on certain aspects of subjects’ social preferences. Interestingly, however, although Oxytocin affects trusting behavior, it has no effect on subjects’ trustworthiness. — social preferences ; foundations of trust ; neuroeconomic
- (2005) In: The American economic review. – Bd. 95.2005, 2, S. 346-351. prüfen & bestellen
- (June 2005) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 1641
- (2005) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 221
Altruists with Green beards / Ernst Fehr; Urs Fischbacher.
- (2005) In: Analyse & Kritik. – Stuttgart. – Bd. 27.2005, 1, S. 73-84. prüfen & bestellen
Human altruism : proximate patterns and evolutionary origins / Ernst Fehr; Urs Fischbacher.
- (2005) In: Analyse & Kritik. – Stuttgart. – Bd. 27.2005, 1, S. 6-47. prüfen & bestellen
The neuroeconomics of mind reading and empathy / by Tania Singer and Ernst Fehr.
The most fundamental solution concepts in Game Theory Nash equilibrium, backward induction, and iterated elimination of dominated strategies are based on the assumption that people are capable of predicting others’ actions. These concepts require people to be able to view the game from the other players’ perspectives, i.e. to understand others’ motives and beliefs. Economists still know little about what enables people to put themselves into others’ shoes and how this ability interacts with their own preferences and beliefs. Social neuroscience provides insights into the neural mechanism underlying our capacity to represent others’ intentions, beliefs, and desires, referred to as “Theory of Mind” or “mentalizing”, and the capacity to share the feelings of others, referred to as “empathy”. We summarize the major findings about the neural basis of mentalizing and empathizing and discuss some implications for economics. — neuroeconomics ; mind reading ; empathy
- (2005) In: The American economic review. – Bd. 95.2005, 2, S. 340-345. prüfen & bestellen
- (July 2005) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 1647
- (2005) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 5128 : Labour economics prüfen & bestellen
- (2005) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 222
Do workers work more if wages are high? : evidence from a randomized field experiment / by Ernst Fehr and Lorenz Goette.
- (2007) In: The American economic review. – Bd. 97.2007, 1, (Mar.2007) S. 298-317. prüfen & bestellen
- (2005) Sept. 2005. – Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 125. – Zürich
- (2002) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 125
Behavioral economics research and the foundations of economics / Vernon L. smith.
- (2005) In: The journal of socio-economics. – Amsterdam [u.a.]. – Bd. 34.2005, 2, S. 135-150. prüfen & bestellen
The role of equality, efficiency, and Rawlsian motives in social preferences : a reply to Engelmann and Strobel / Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2004) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 179
Fairness and incentives in a multi-task principal-agent model / Ernst Fehr; Klaus M. Schmidt.
- (2004) In: The Scandinavian journal of economics. – Bd. 106.2004, 3, S. 453-474. prüfen & bestellen
- (2004) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 191
- (2004) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 4464 : Industrial organization prüfen & bestellen
Contracts, fairness, and incentives / Ernst Fehr; Alexander Klein; Klaus M. Schmidt.
We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that are doomed to fail when there are only selfish actors provide powerfulincentives and become superior when there are also fair-minded players. These predictions are strongly supported by the results of a series of experiments. Furthermore, our results suggest that the existence of fair actors may be an important reason why many contracts are left deliberately incomplete.
- (2004) CESifo working paper series ; 1215 : Labour markets
- (2001) CESifo working paper series ; 445
Is strong reciprocity a maladaptation? On the evolutionary foundations of human altruism / Ernst Fehr and Joseph Heinrich.
- (2003) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 140
Fairness, errors and the power of competition / Urs Fischbacher, Christina M. Fong and Ernst Fehr.
- (2003) Dec. 2003. – Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 133. – Zürich
On the nature of fair behavior / Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr, and Urs Fischbacher.
- (2003) In: Economic inquiry. – Hoboken, NJ. – Bd. 41.2003, 1, S. 20-26. prüfen & bestellen
A nationwide laboratory : examining trust and trust-worthiness by integrating behavioural experiments into representative surveys / Ernst Fehr ….
- (2003) Discussion paper series / Centre for Economic Policy Research ; 3858 : Industrial organization, labour economics and public policy prüfen & bestellen
- (2003) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 141
- (2003) CESifo working paper series ; 866 : Public choice
- (2003) Diskussionspapier / Technische Universität Berlin, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Dokumentation ; 2003/1 prüfen & bestellen
- (Feb. 2003) Discussion paper series / Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit ; 715
- (2002) Discussion papers / German Institute for Economic Research ; 319
- (2002) In: Schmollers Jahrbuch. – Bd. 122.2002, 4, S. 519-542. prüfen & bestellen
Fairness in the labour market : a survey of experimental results / Simon Gächter and Ernst Fehr.
- (2002) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 114
- (2002) In: Surveys in experimental economics. – 2002, S. 95-132. prüfen & bestellen
The Hidden costs and returns of incentives – trust and trustworthiness among CEOs / Ernst Fehr; John A. List.
- (2004) In: Journal of the European Economic Association. – Bd. 2.2004, 5, S. 743-771. prüfen & bestellen
- (2002) Working paper / Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich ; 134 S
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Gerechtigkeit 
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Spieltheorie
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Test
Wesentliches Schlagwort: Verhaltensökonomik
Wesentliche Person: Ernst Fehr 
Wesentliche Person: Urs Fischbacher
Wesentliche Person: Susanne Kremhelmer
Wesentliche Person: Klaus M. Schmidt
Wesentliche Person: Jürgen Schupp
Wesentliche Person: Christian Zehnder
Wesentliche Reihe: Working paper Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. of Zurich
